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1. SUMMARY: Whether a Tennessee statute that authorizes 
r -
the use of deadly force as a last resort to apprehend a 
nondangerous suspect fleeing a nonviolent felony violates either 
the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause. ---2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: On the night of October 3, 
1974, two Memphis police officers responded to a call from a 
person who reported that a burglary was underway next door. One 
.. 
of the officers w~nt around to the back of the house, heard the 
door slam, and saw a·figure running to the back of the lot. The 
I 
officer shone a light on the suspect, and could see that he was a 
youth (15 years old) and apparently unarmed. As the boy jumped 
to get over the back fence, the officer fired at the upper part 
of the boy's body, because he believed the boy would elude 
capture in the dark once he was over the fence. 
The officer was following standard procedure, because a 
Tennessee statute has been interpreted as allowing the use of 
deadly force against a fleeing felon rather than running the risk 
of allowing him to escape. That statute provides: • 
If, after notice of the intention to arrest the 
defendant, he either flee cfr forcibly r·esist, the 
officer may use•all the necessary means to effect the 
arrest. I' 
The statute allows an officer to use deadly force as a last 
resort to effect an arrest when no other means of apprehension is 
available. 
In 1975, the decedent's father brought a § 1983 action 
against the City and the police department, as well as a number 
of police officials and the police ' officer who killed the 
suspect, to recover damages for wrongful death caused by 
-3-
violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The 
defendants other than the officer were joined on the ground that 
their failure to exercise due care in hiring, training, and 
supervising the officer made them equally responsible for the 
death. A decision in favor of defendants was affirmed against 
the individual defendants, but remanded as against the City for 
reconsideration in light of~~ll v. Department of Social 
Services, 436 u.s. 658 (1978). On remand, the DC held that the 
statute was not ~nconstitutional and the City was therefore not 
liable. On appeal, the CA6 held that the law authorized seizures 
-- ·~~-----------
unreasonable under the Fourth Amedment and violative of the Due 
~ 
Process Clause as well. 
The CA first noted that killing a person constitutes a 
~ ~ The CA rejected the State's reliance on the English 
~~ common ~aw, which authorized the use of deadly force against 
~ '~suspects fleeing from any felony. The court noted that this rule 
~vv~ . existed at a time when all of the small number of felonies were 
) I 
capital crimes. The court stated that it is inconsistent with 
the rationale of the common law "to permit the killing of a 
fleeing suspect who has not committed a life endangering or other 
capital offense and who we cannot say is likely to become a 
danger to the community if he eludes immediate capture." TheCA 
observed that the Eighth Circuit in Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F. 2d 
1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot sub nom. Ashcroft v. 
Mattis, 431 u.s. 171 (1977) (per curiam), had held a similar 
Missouri statute unconstitutional as a matter of substantive due 
process because the historical basis for permitting the use of 
-4-
deadly force against nonviolent fleeing felons has been 
substantially eroded. 
The CA could find only one appellate decision that had 
~--~---· --------------
addressed the Fourth Amendment limitations on the use of deadly ----- --- - - --------- ---
force to capture a fleeing suspect. In Jenkins v. Averett, 424 
F. 2d 1228 (1970), the CA4 held that the Fourth Amendment "shield 
covers the individual's physical integrity." The CA6 here 
concluded that the statute was invalid because it was too 
disproportionate, in that it does not make distinctions based on 
the magnitude of the offense or on the need to apprehend the 
suspect. ~CA helJ that before taking the drastic measure of 
using deadly force as a last resort against a fleeing suspect, 
officers should have probable cause to believe that the suspect 
poses a threat to the safety of the officers or a danger to the 
community if left at large. Use of deadly force on less 
information is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
The CA also found that a similar result was mandated under 
the Due Process Clause. The court held that before the state can 
deprive a person of the fundamental right to life it must 
demonstrate a compelling interest. Laws that infringe 
fundamental rights must be narrowly drawn, and this statute is 
not. The state's interest is compelling only when the fleeing 
felon poses a danger to the safety of others. 
The CA held that the Model Penal Code contains an accurate 
statement of constitutional limitations on the use of deadly 
force: 
-5-
The use of deadly force is not justifiable ••• unless 
{i) the arrest is for a felony, and {ii) the person 
effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a peace 
officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be 
authorized to act as a peace officer; and {iii) the 
actor believes that the force employed creates no 
substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and 
{iv) the actor believes that {1) the crime for which 
the arrest is made involved conduct including the use 
or threatened use of deadly force; or {2) there is a 
substantial risk that the person to be arrested will 
cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension 
is delayed. 
Model Penal Code § 3.07{2) {b) {Proposed Official Draft, 
1962). 
The CA noted that its decision was in conflict with a CA2 
..._...-
decision that had declined to adopt the Model Penal Code test. 
See Jones v. Marshall, 528 F. 2d 132 {1975). 
The CA went on to conclude that the City could not claim a 
good-faith defense based upon its reliance on the state statute. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The State argues that the decision below 
calls into question similar laws in 24 states. The Fourth 
Amendment does not proscribe the use of deadly force as a 
necessary last resort to capture a suspect whom police have 
probable cause to believe committed a felony. The question of 
when deadly force should be applied is one of public policy that 
should be entrusted to the legislature. The CA6 had previously 
upheld the statute in Wiley v. Memphis Police Department, 548 F. 
2d 1247, cert. denied, 434 u.s. 822 {1977), and in Beech v. 
Melancon, 465 F. 2d 425 (1972), cert. denied, 409 u.s. 1114 
(1973). The decision extends unwarranted constitutional 
protection to the felon as a matter of constitutional law. 
-6-
Resp argues that there is no conflict with Jones v. 
Marshall, because that case was decided before Monell and decided 
only that a police officer was privileged under § 1983 to use 
force. The deadly force policies of over 70% of large cities 
would not permit such force to be used in a case such as this 
one. The clear position of the organized, professional police 
community refutes the state's argument that effective law 
enforcement will be hampered without the authority to shoot 
nondangerous fleeing felony suspects. 
The Memphis Police Department has a history of relying on 
deadly force to a far greater degree than necessary. Moreover, 
the policy discriminates on the basis of race, because blacks are 
shot at a much higher frequency than whites. 
4. DISCUSSION: The question here seems substantial. On 
the one hand, there are strong policy reasons for a rule that 
nondangerous felons should not be killed merely to prevent their 
escape. On the other hand, it takes what may be a significant 
~ ' 
arrow from the quiver of the police. A "nondangerous" felon who 
/
knows that he cannot be shot simply for trying to escape has 
little incentive not to try. Of course, a great number of police 
. ) 
departments already operate with apparent success under such a 
rule. The CA's adoption of the Model Penal Code as 
constitutional gospel i~ also somewhat troubling. 
The appellation "nonviolent" in this case is also somewhat 
of a problem. Although it turned out that the house was empty 
and that the suspect was unarmed, burglary is a crime that is 
often associated with violence. Many burglars are armed, and 
-7-
many people are killed by burglars each year. The lumping of the 
burglary suspect with an antitrust violator for constitutional 
purposes does not make that much sense. Moreover, although the 
statute at issue applies only to felonies, I don't see why as a 
constitutional matter deadly force could not be used against a 
violent misdemeanant. 
Resp's arguments concerning the discriminatory operation of 
the policy are simply not relevant, because the CA6 struck down 
the statute on its face. His attempt to distinguish Jones v. 
Marshall is unpersuasive, because the CA2 there was not 
discussing merely the officers' privilege when acting pursuant to 
policy. The CA2 stated: 
This would seem peculiarly to be one of those areas 
where some room must be left to the individual states 
to place-a-Iltg-h-e-r--V-aLUcreon-tne1nte-res-E 1ntn is case 
of ~d vigorous law enforcement, than on 
the rights of individuals reasonably suspected to have 
engaged in the commission of a serious crime .•.. While 
the Fourteenth Amendment may require us to make an 
independent assessment of the fairness of the state 
rule, however, we are today interpreting § 1983, and 
within that statute states must be given some leeway in 
the administration of their systems of justice, at 
least insofar as determining the scope of such an 
unsettled rule as an arresting officer's privilege for 
the use of deadly force. Further, in the light of the 
shifting history of the privilege, we cannot conclude 
that the Connecticut rule is fundamentally unfair. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: Especially in light of the fact that 
this is an appeal, I think review by this Court may be 
appropriate. Consequently, I recommend noting probable 
jurisdiction. 
There is a response. 
March 7, 1984 Browne Opin in petn. 
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No. 83-1070, Memphis Police Department v. Garner 
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary 
reading of the briefs. 
The caption of this case, stated above, refers to the original 
§1983 suit. The State of Tennessee was allowed to intervene, and 
- ---. 
because the case involves the constitutionality of a state statute, 
• • 11 \\ 
1t has f1led an appeal under the same number - 83-1035. The ques-
tion presented, as stated in the jurisdictional statement, is: 
"Whether Tennessee Code §40-7-108 is uncon-
stitutional as repugnant to the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution 
of the United States?" 
I£ \ \ 
The petition for cert, filed by the police department and --------
others, states the questions differently. But the issue is the 
same: the validity of §40-7-108 that reads as follows: 
"Resistance of Officer - if, after notice of the 
intention to arrest the defendant, he either 
flees or forcibly resists, the officer may use 
all the necessary means to effect the arrest." 
No. 83-1070 2. 
This statute is known as the "Deadly Force Statute" that 
codifies the common law "fleeing felon" rule - a rule that 
~
allows the use of deadly force against even a non-violent 
fleeing felon. Reversing the DC, CA 6 held the Tennessee 
statute facially invalid. 
The Facts 
The briefs of the parties summarize the facts favorably 
to their respective positions. The findings of fact made by LJC: s 
the DC following the original trial of this case are set forth ~7 ~ 
in the petition for cert. See A-2 et seq. In summary, Memphis 
police, told by a neighbor that the home next door was being 
burglarized, went to the scene where Officer Hymen went to the 
west side of the house, a side yard cluttered with chicken wire 
and other obstacles. It was dark (at night), he heard a door 
slam and saw a figure running from the back of the house to the 
back of the lot where a cyclone fence - six feet high - extended 
across the boundray of the property. 
Hymen could see a garbage can placed under a window and 
that "the glass was broken out of the window". Using his flash-
light, Hymen saw a figure "in a stooped position next to the 
cyclone fence". The DC stated that: "He (the figure) did not 
appear to be armed, but Hymen could not be certain of this at 
the moment." (A-4). Hymon shouted "halt'', and identified him-
self as a police officer. Hymon testified that in the poor 
No. 83-1070 3. 
visibility the figure appeared to him to be a black male 
- --~---------
about five feet six inches tall and about 17 or 18 years old. 
See A-5, n. 3. The figure paused for a moment, and then 
leaped to the top of the fence and was "half over" when Hymon 
shot. Using a service revolver, loaded with "hollow point" 
bullets, Hymon hit the youth in the side of the head - a fatal 
wound. 
The youth, named Garner, was only 15 years old, he was not 
armed, and although the residence clearly had been burglarized, 
Garner had only about $10.00 in cash and jewelry in his pockets. 
Garner had been sentenced to probation twice by juvenile courts 
-p~ 
on burglary charges. ~Ld-1-tq 
~
This suit was instituted by Garner's father under §1983 
claiming, so far as presently relevant, invalidity of the 
~ _, Te~nessee statute under both the "unreasonable search and seizure" 
ovision of the IV Amendment and the due process provision of 
~~ the XIV Amendment. Officer Hymon, because he acted in accor-
~ danc~with Tennessee law and pursuant to police department 
I~-~uctions with respect to the use of deadly force, was held 
{IP"- h f . h . . . . . . to ave good a1t 1mmun1ty. Follow1ng our dec1s1ons 1n Monell 
~
and City of Independence (and a resulting remand to the DC for 
reconsideration in light of these decisions) , the case came back 
to CA 6 that held the Tennessee statute invalid. 
No. 83-1070 4. 
The Decision of CA 6 (~ ~~ ~~~ JIJL~ 
The panel of Chief Judge Edwards, and Judges Keith and Merrit 
was unanimous, with the opinion written by Judge Merrit. After 
summarizing the evidence somewhat more favorably to its ultimate 
holding than perhaps the findings of fact by DC justified, found 
the statute facially invalid under both the IV and XIV Amendments. 
The CA stated that the statute had been construed as follows: 
"Tennessee courts have interpreted their 
statute regarding the capture of fleeing felons 
to create a jury question on the issue of the 
..r'.~ ... ~. ~· "reasonableness" and the "necessity" of using 
J ,!/"- 1 .-..-<,.. deadly force. But the "reasonableness" and 
~tu'r "necessity" of the officer's action must be 
,,~ judged solely on the basis of whether the 
(/(1 ~b ·~ ...--- officer could h ave arrested the suspect with-
~~- o~~him. ~Purporting to follow the v1 r u le deve Loped in England at common law allow-
ing the use of deadly force against suspects 
fleeing from any felony, Tennessee courts have ~ 
interpreted their statute to mean that once it ~ 
is determined that the officer probably could ~~ 1 ~~·­
not_ ha e c tured the person wit hout fir i ng , W /J ~, t 
t e Jury sho d 1 t e police action rea- ~ 7 
sonable under the statute." A44 
. ~ The CA recognized that "the common law permitted the killing 
~~ of a felon who resists arrest without regard to the nature of the 
V ~elony". But the harshness of the common law rule was viewed as 
~ having been ameliorated by more modern jurisprudence. It relied 
particularly on the proposed Model Criminal Code of the ALI. 
No. 83-1070 5. 
The rationale of CA 6 is summarized in a paragraph on p. A51 of 
the petition. I quote only a portion of it: 
"The Tennessee statute in question here is 
invalid because it does not put sufficient limits 
on the use of deadly force. It is "too dispropor-
tionate." It does not make distinctions based on 
"gravity and need" nor on the "the magnitude of 
the offense." Before taking the drastic measure 
of using deadly force as a last resort against a 
~ fleeing suspect, officers should have probable 
~ cause to believe not s f mp i y t hat €he suspect has 
~ . ~· ~~ c omm1Et e d s ome felony. Tfiey s hould have proba ble 
11 _ ~  cau~ve that the suspect oses a 
~ .. A~ ho threat to t e s9 e ~ of t e o 1cers or a danger 
~- tl:ie cormnun~eft at large.-n- -
~~ ~terestingly enough, the court relied on language in th 
~~~ssent of Chief Justice Burge; in the Bivens case -
~ hief drew a ~istinct~n between the use of deadly force "to ,, 
,, . . h 
~re ent the escape ~~d k1lle..,r" and to prevent t e 
,,...t-- " v· of "car t hiefs, pickpockets or a shoplifter." See ASO. 
--~--~~ I 
Comment 
The briefs of the parties, including amici briefs, are 
not particularly helpful. There seems to be - to use the over-
worked phrase - "more heat than light" in what counsel say. 
The case presents a difficult and important constitutional 
issue. On the facts in this case, one's initial reaction is 
No. 83-1070 6 • 
to think the officer committed an unjustified murder of an 
unarmed fifteen year old kid whose crime was a minor breaking 
and entering. But upon more thoughtful reflection, it is clear 
that the officer acted in "good faith" under Tennessee law and 
as he had been instructed. Nor were the facts quite as indefen-
sable as CA 6 and appellees' brief view t~. It i~nceded that 
Officer Hymon had probable cause to believe a felony had been 
committed - as indeed was the case. In the darkness of a strange 
yard, with obstructions preventing the officer from moving closer, 
it was not easy to make considered judgments in the few seconds 
during which the action occurred. As Hyrnon testified, he had 
~no reason to believe but could not 
be sure. Nor did he know whether the felon had a confederate who 
~
might be armed. Apparently he could see the person well enough 
to think he was a young black, 17 or 18 years of age. Hymon 
himself was a black (I believe). When the escaping person refused 
to halt when ordered to do so, the officer did what he was taught 
to do. 
Thus, the case squarely presents the constitutional question 
as to the validity of a "fleeing felon" statute that - according 
to one of the briefs - is in effect in more than half of our 
states, in addition to having been the common law rule. The ques-
k~~ 
tion that concerns me is how a cons~tutional statute that reasonably 
~ 
would protect both the interests of persons reasonably suspected 
of crime and the general public interest in preventing felons to 
escape. There is little in CA 6's opinion that provides guidance. 
No. 83-1070 7 • 
Borrowing from The Chief's dicta in Bivens, CA 6 says the 
statute is invalid because it "does not put sufficient limits 
on the use of deadly force". It makes no distinction between 
''gravity and need" nor does it require consideration of the 
"magnitude of the offense". Moreover, an officer should have 
"probable cause to believe that the suspect posing a threat to 
the safety of the officers or danger to the community if left 
at large". 
How one writes these safeguards into a statute is far from 
clear. Even if the precise language of CA 6 were included in 
a statute, issues of fact would continue to exist as they did 
in this case. The Tennessee rule, based on interpretation of 
the statute by its courts, creat~a "jury question on the issue 
A 
of the 'reasonableness' and the 'necessity' of using deadly 
force." If the Tennessee construction stopped at this point, 
it may be viewed more charitably. Questions of reasonableness 
present issue of fact quite similar to the factual issues that 
CA 6 would create. But apparently the Tennessee courts have 
not stopped with the general requirement of reasonableness and 
necessity. As paraphrased by CA 6 the "officer's action must 
be judged solely on the basis of whether the officer could have 
arrested the suspect without shooting him." If indeed this is 
the law in Tennessee, I would doubt the validity of the statute. 
NO. 83-1070 8. 
If the facts in this case had come within The Chief Justic~s 
Bivens dictum, one readily could agree. For example, if in day-
light, an officer had seen a 15 year old kid shoplift and run, 
clearly it would have been grossly unreasonable to shoot the kid 
in the back. Burglary not only is a serious felony but also 
frequently it leads to violence and sometimes to murder. The 
------------- ~------~----------~ 
difficulty with CA 6's decision is that Officer Hymon could not 
possibly have made the judgments it would require. He could not 
be sure of the "gravity" of the burglary. He could not even be 
sure that violence had not committed within the house. These 
questions also would relate to the ''magnitude" of the offense. 
How could Hymon have made an informed judgment as to the escaping 
person's danger to the community if left at large"? 
* * * 
I have perhaps become unduly interested in this case and 
talked into the dictating machine more than my secretary - or 
the law clerk - appreciates. I have little doubt that the 
Tennessee statute on its face is too open-ended to be valid. 
My clerk should take a close look at the Tennessee Supreme 
COurt's construction of the statute. Its validity is to be 
determined only as the statute has been construed. The range 
of felonies is quite wide, and clearly it would be unreasonable 
if an officer were authorized to shoot any fleeing felon regard-
less of the crime and the circumstances. I will be interested 
in my clerk's views. 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell October 18, 1984 
From: Lee 
No. 83-1070, Memphis Police Department, et al. v. Cleamtee 
Garner, et al. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
(1) Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit the use of deadly force to 
· tJL _____ fo~~ 
effect the arrest of a "~n-violent" felon? -r~ 2~' .. 
(2) If the use of deadly force must be limited to violent felon~~ 
is the burglary of a dwelling a "violent felony"? '7 
I. Factual Background ) ~~ 
On October 3, 1974, a neighbor reported the burgl~ ~' -
a Memphis residence to the police. Two o(ficers were dispatched 
immediately, and arrived while the burglary was still in 
progress. One officer remained in the car to make a radio 
report, while the other officer, Hymon, ran behind the house. As 
Hymon approached the back corner of the house, he heard the rear 
door slam shut. He ran into the back yard, and began looking 
around with his flashlight. He saw the figure of a black male 
crouched next to a fence about thirty or forty feet away. The 
burglary suspect did not appear to be armed. 
Officer Hymon identified himself, and ordered the 
suspect to "halt." Nevertheless, after a short pause, the young 
man started to climb over the six-foot fence. Hymon, realizing 
that he would not be able to apprehend the suspect on foot, fired 
his gun at the moving figure. The fleeing burglar was hit in the 
back of the head, and he subsequently died from the wound. The 
deceased was identified as Edward Garner, a fifteen-year-old .----·---
black male. Garner had taken only ten dollars and some jewelry 
~--~--~-----------J 
from the house, which was unoccupied at the time of the burglary. 
~ ------. 
At the time of the shooting, the Memphis police ~ 
department did not have a formal policy with respect to the use f-.___. __ . 0 
·~ r~rr~ 
of deadly force. Apparently, police officers were told to use 
the force permitted by state law. Because Tennessee had adopted h/a<-
the ~m?~ 1~ see Tenn. Code Ann. §40-7-108, policemen /-!:> 
were allowed to use deadly force when necessary to effect the ~ 
arrest of ~ fleeing felon. ~ 
II. The Decisions Below 
.. f' 
. . 
The decedent's father, Cleamtee Garner, filed a §).9'83 
~ 
action against the City of Memphis, the police department, the 
mayor, and Officer Hymon. The plaintiff claimed that his son's 
constitutional rights were violated by the shooting. Holding 
that the city and the police department were not "persons" within 
the meaning of §1983, the DC dismissed the action against the 
municipal defendants. See Monroe v. Pape, 364 u.s. 167 (1961). 
The V DC also dismissed the action against the individual 
defendants. The court found that they had acted in good faith 
reliance upon a Tennessee statute, which permits a police officer 
to shoot a fleeing felon in order to prevent his escape. See 
Tenn.C.A. §40-7-108. 
VcA6 affirmed the DC's decision that the individual 
defendants were protected by the doctrine of qualified immunity. 
The CA reversed the DC's judgment as to the municipal defendants, 
however. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 u.s. 
658 (1978), which was decided after the DC had issued its 
opinion, a city can be sued for damages caused by an 
unconstitutional "policy or custom." 
·~
the case so 
that the lower court could reconsider its decision in light of 
Monell. 
On remand, the~C held that its decision was unaffected 
by Monell because Edward Garner's constitutional rights were not 
violated by the shooting. 
In reversing the DC's judgment, CA6 held that Edward {!J/14 
Garner's fourth amendment righ~d been violated. 1 The 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
of deadly force to capture Garner, who was suspected of 
committing only a non-violent felony, constituted an .......__ 
"unreasonable seizure." TheCA found support for its decision in 
a dissent by the Chief Justice. The dissent states that a "shoot 
order" to apprehend a pickpocket, car thief, or shop lifter would 
be "intolerable." YBl vens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 u.s. 388, 
411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Because Officer Hymon had 
no reason to believe that Garner had committed a violent felony, 
the shooting violated his fourth amendment rights. The Tennessee ~~ 
statute was held to be unconstitutional to the extent that it I).J~ 
permitted policemen to use deadly force in arresting non-violent ~ 
felons. 2 The court criticiz~ rul§ for its 
failure to consider the "gravity of the offense." 
CA6 further held that the Tennessee statute violates the 
Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Because the 
common law rule often deprives suspects of their lives, it must 
be justified by a "compelling state interest." The court 
conceded that the Tennessee statute aids the state in the 
1while the second appeal was pending, the clerk of CA6 informed 
/ 
the Attorney General of Tennessee that Tenn. Code Ann. §40-7-108 
was bei ng challenged on constitutional grounds. Pursuant to 28 
u.s.c. ~ 24 03(c), the ~tate filed a motion to inEervene for the 
purpose 'of defending the constitutionality of its fleeing felon 
rule. The motion was granted, and the state became a party to 
the action. 
2cA6 also stated that deadly force may be used if there is 
pr bable c use to believe e person o be~d will 
cause death or ser1ou bo il if his apprehension is 
delayed." Borrowed from Model Penal Co e §3.07(2) (b), this 
justification or the use is not relevant to the 
case at hand. t ~ p~ ~ ';, n-uh 
I 
.. 
administration of its criminal justice system, which depends upon 
bringing suspects to trial. Nevertheless, CA6 found that 
interest was not sufficiently compelling to justify 
· deadly force to apprehend non-violent criminals. The 
with approval Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 
in which CAS invalidated a fleeing felon statute on 
due process grounds. 
Finally, the court held that the City of Me 
police department, although 
r---------
statute, were not entitled See Owen v. -----
City of Independence, 445 u.s. 622 Therefore, the 
plaintiff could recover damages from the cipal defendants. ~ 
The municipal defendants and hi~. }I. . \,1 sought review by 1-r,-~ 
this Court, and filed separate merits 
DISCUSSION 
I. The Common Law Rule 
Tennessee has codified the common law rule that a 
policeman may shoot ~ fleeing felon in order to prevent his 
escape. See Tenn Code Ann. 3 §40-7-108. This statute was 
Supreme Court has not construed the statute so 
as to perm· the use of deadl orce on aga1ns v1o ent felony 
suspect In Scarborough v. State, 168 Tenn. 106 (1934), the 
court tated that deadly force may be used against an automobile 
th' f, if necessary to effect his arrest. Nothing in more recent 
ses suggests an intention to depart from this common law rule. 
See, e.g., State v. Boles, 598 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn.App. 1980). 
Indeed, in his brief filed with the CA, the state Attorney ~ 
General ~that "Tennessee courts and enforcement agencies 
int~tute to permit the use of deadly force agasint 
Footnote continued on next page. 
\ .. ' ... 
~~~~ 
invalidated by C 6, which held ~ the use of deadly force to 
apprehend non-viol the fourth amendment. The 
state points at 
the time the fourth amendment was it is 
unlikely that the Framers intended to preclude the 
force to effect the arrest of any felon. Although this line of 
reasoning is plausible, it fails to recognize that most of the 
justifications for the common law rule no longer exist. 
,/ ~on h5-only a few ~crimes, such as?, 
murder, v rape, and Y manslaughter, were classified as felonies.) 
Because all of these crimes were punishable by death, the use of 
deadly force was viewed as an acceleration of the penal process. 
Note, The Use of Deadly Force in Arizona by Police Officers, 1973 
L. & Soc. Order 481, 482. The use of deadly force was further 
justified by the necessity of capturing felons at the scene of 
the crime. With no national network of police forces, a suspect 
who eluded his initial pursuers probably would never be captured. 
Note, Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering Constitutional Review, 
11 Harv. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 361 (1976). 
Late in the nineteenth century, several developments in ~ 
this country weakened the justifications for the common law rule. 
First, an increase in the number of crimes classified as felonies 
led to authorization of deadly force in many more situations than 
at common law. Second, restrictions placed on the death penalty 
any fleeing felon, whatever the felony." 
l 
meant that, in most states, the only crimes punishable by death 
were those endangering life or bodily security. See Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 u.s. 238, 331-341 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
This change undermined the penal rationale for the rule. 
Finally, police departments were established all over the 
country, so that a suspect who initially eluded capture was more 
likely to be arrested later. 4 
Tennessee's statute should not be invalidated simply 
because the original justifications for the common law rule no 
longer exist. The federal courts do not sit to evaluate the 
wisdom of state legislative judgments. Nevertheless, given the 
changes that occurred in the late nineteenth century, this Court 
should not hold the fleeing felon rule constitutional simply 
because it was recognized at common law when the fourth amendment 
was ratified. 
II. The Fourth Amendment Analysis 
The CA' s holding that the fleeing felon rule violates 
the fourth amendment is not without problems. The apprehension 
of a suspect through the use of deadly force certainly 
4Although the justifications for the common law rule largely 
disappeared in the late 1800's, the courts proved "reluctant to 
abandon a convenient pigeon-hole disposal of cases on the basis 
of whether the crime was a felony or a misdemeanor." Pearson, 
The Right to Kill in Making Arrests, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 957 (1930). 
~
Even today, in those eight jurisdictions where the legislature 
has not intervened, the common rule remains unchanged. At least 




constitutes a "seizure." Cf. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 
u.s. 544, 553 (1980) (a person is "seized" when his freedom of 
movement is restrained) . Nevertheless, it is not so clear that 
this seizure is "unreasonable." In order to decide this point, 
the Court must balance the government 1 s need for the "seizure" 
against the intrusion that the "seizure" represents. 
""" rtk ~ ~r The government has a strong interest in effecting the 
~Jy··pa-rr_est of all sus ects. Without arrests, none of the goals of 
{#J ~e criminal law can be achieved: there can be no retribution, 
IY incapacitation, rehabilitation, or deterrence. The common law 
rule enhances the state 1 s ability to bring suspected felons to 
justice, and enables the police to capture some fugitives who 
otherwise would outrun or outmuscle their pursuers. More 
importantly, the rule deters other suspects from attempting to 
elude the police. 
Although the state has a strong interest in arresting 
non-violent felons, the common law rule is not a prerequisite to 
realizing that goal. It is undisputed that in most cases, the 
police can apprehend a criminal suspect without resorting to 
deadly force. Moreover, it seems obvious that non-violent 
felons, by their nature, probably will yield to less force. 
Moreover, because they usually are sentenced to shorter prison 
terms if convicted, non-violent felons have less incentive to 
take chances when running from the police. Finally, if the non-
violent felon eludes the police, often he can be apprehended 
later. Cooperation among police departments hinders a criminal 




difficult to arrest non-violent 
law rule will make it more 
felons. Thus, the state does 
have some "need" for its fleeing felon statute. This 
governmental "need" must be balanced against the "intrusion" of 
the use of deadly force. The taking of a human life is obviously 
the most serious "intrusion" possible. It outweighs any 
conceivable interest that the state has in the common law rule. 
A marginal improvement in the state's success rate in dealing 
with crimes against property, does not justify killing. 
As the reasoning above suggests, the common law rule 
probably cannot be invalidated in the absence of a judicial 
"finding" that the state's interest in dealing with violent crime 
is greater than its interest in controlling non-violent crime. 
' i ,, 
Traditionally, in interpreting the rourth amendment, the Court 
has not looked at the gravity of the underlying offense. In 
Mincey v. Arizona, .· lor example, the state's "murder scene 
exception" to the warrant requirement was rejected. The Court 
held that for there was no principled distinction between a 
murder scene, and the scene of a rape, robbery, or burgalary. 
Nevertheless, a case decided last term indicates that it is 
sometimes appropriate to consider the grav1 of the underlying 
~----~~----------~------------------------~~--------~ 
offense. In Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Court held that the nature 
of the offense is an important actor to consider in deciding 
whether exigent circumstances jus ify the warrantless search of a 
home. In Welsh, the Court 




that the warrantless search of 
river was impermissible, when the 
riminal traffic violation. 
Given the current Court's willingness to consider the 
gravity of the underlying offense, I think that the state's 
fleeing felon rule, as it applies to non-violent felons, should 
be invalidated on fourth amendment grounds. 5 
III. Substantive Due Process 
Under the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, the deprivation of a fundamental right must be 
justified by a "compelling" state interest. Tennessee's fleeing 
felon rule often results in the loss of "life," a fundamental 
right. Therefore, as it has done in other substantive due 
process decisions, the Court must weigh carefully the relevant 
interests. See,e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113 (1973}. Using 
the reasoning set forth in the preceding section, the Court could 
find that the Tennessee statute does not further a "compelling" 
state interest. At least one other court has invalidated a 
fleeing felon statute on substantive due process grounds. See 
.........__ - - ---------------------
Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976} (en bane}, 
.-
vacated sub. nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 43l · u.s. 171- (1977}. 
Despite the plausibility of the substantive due process 
approach, the Court should rely solely upon the fourth amendment 
--___,.-<---/ ;:,.,:;_wcy~ $ ~ 9 ~ 
5 rn Welsh,/ the Court noted that "the State of Wisconsin has 
chosen to classify the first offense for driving while 
intoxicated as a noncriminal civil forfeiture 0~fense for which 
no imprisonment is possible." Therefore, in ~aking its decision 
as to the ~y of the offense, the Court,~as able to look to 
the state legislature for guidance. A bright line between \ 
violent and non-violent felonies, on the other hand, would be 
drawn regardless of how a state chooses to punish these crimes. 
[ 
in invalidating the Tennessee statute. The relevance of the ~ 
fourth amendment is clear, for its primary function has been to ~ 
place limits on police practices involving the apprehension and If,'!:: 
investigation of criminal suspects. Substantive due process, on ~ 
the other hand, has been used to protect freedom of choice in 
matters involving family and procreation. The use of substantive 
due process has been criticized by many commentators as 
unprincipled. See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on 
Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 935 (1973). Therefore, I think 
that the Court should avoid relying upon the Due Process Clause 
when a more specific constitutional guarantee can be used to 
reach the desired result. 
IV. Is Burglary a "Violent Felony"? 
Tennessee's fleeing felon rule is unconstitutional on 
its face, for it allows the use 
f 
arrest of non-violent criminal 
of deadly force to effect the 
{ 
suspects. Nevertheless, the 
statute is not unconstitutional as applied to Garner. The crime 
\ 
that he committed should be considered "violent" for pu of 
fourth amendment analysis. 
CA6 held that a crime is not "violent" unless it 
The CA J 
Instead, 
the court should have looked at the ~ of crime committed by 
involves or threatened use of deadly force." the "use 
thus focuses upon thEi! facts of• the particular crime. 
the suspect. Some felonies, such as burglary, often result in 
<----- .--- -
death or serious bodily injury. Whether physical harm occur 
during a particular incident is largely a matter of chance. The 
~ 
~'$~ 
state obviously has a tremendous interest in ensuring that its 
criminal justice system deals effectively such crimes. If "non-
violent" burglars are not incapacitated, rehabilitated, or 
deterred, they may burglarize again, and cause death or serious 
physical injury during ensuing in9idents. 
The approach taken by the CA is not meritless. It may 
be wise to limit the use of deadly force to situations when the 
-----------------~------------
police officer believes that ilie '~uspect used or threatened to 
---------------------------------------------~~~~---===~------
use deadly force ~ First proposed by the drafters of the Model 
> 
Penal Code, fourteen state legislatures have adopted this rule. 
Nevertheless, this model legislation should not be transformed 
into a constitutional requirement. The state has a large 
interest in dealing effectively with crimes that often result in 
death or physical injury. Therefore, I think that the decision 
whether a crime is "violent," for purposes of fourth amendment 
ll l' analysis, should depend upon the type of crime co mitted. --~ 
SUMMARY 
CA6 was correct in finding that Tennessee's fleeing 
felon statute, on its face, violates the fourth amendment • 
• 
Policemen should not be permitted to use deadly force in order to 
effect the arrest of "non-violent" felons. Nevertheless, the 
~
L ta t~u_t_e ___ i_s __ n_o_t _ u_n_c_o_n_s _t _i_t_u_t_l_· o_n_a_l _ a_s __ a_P_P_l_i_e_d __ t_o_ t_h_e __ f_a_c_t_s __ o_f_ t_h_ i s 
case. A crime should be considered "violent," if it is the ~ 
. -
of crime that often results in death or seriously bodily injury. 
entering of a dwelling wi 11 result in 
to the victims. Therefore, the Memphis police 
officer was justified in using deadly force to apprehend Garner. 
The judgment of CA6 should be reversed. 
alb 10/27/84 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: Nos. 83-1035, 83-1070, Tennessee v. Cleamtee Garner, et al. 
and Memphis Police Dept. v. Cleamtee Garner, et al., the Model 
Penal Code definition of burglary 
Section 221.1 (1) of the Model Penal Code defines 
"burglary" as the entry "of a building or occupied structure 
with the purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises 
are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed or 
privileged to enter." The Introductory Note recognizes that it 
would be possible to eliminate "burglary" as a separate offense. 
The criminal action could be treated as an attempt to commit the 
intended crime plus an offense of criminal trespass. 
Nevertheless, the drafters decided to treat ."burglary" as an 
independent substantive offense because of their "considered 
judgment that especially severe sanctions are appropriate for 
criminal invasion of premises under circumstances likely to 
terrorize occupants." 
The definition of "burglary" itself reflects the 
~
drafters' concern for human safety. The entry must be 
unprivileged; unprivileged entries, unlike the shoplifting 
situation, often result in physical violence. Moreover, the MPC 
provides that an affirmative defense to a prosecution for 
burglary is that the building or structure was abandoned. This, 
~ of course, suggests that the drafters were less concerned about 
"crimes against property." 
' [ 
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Copyright <c> 1982 The Washington Post 
September 30, 1982, Thursday, Final Edition 
HEADLINE: Police Add 50,000-Volt Weapon to Arsenal 
BYLINE: By Ed Bruske and Alfred E. Lewis, Washington Post Staff Writers 
KEYWORD: TASER 
BODY: 
Future shock has arrived in the District of Columbia police department. 
Tomorrow, members of the department's Special Operations Division are 
scheduled to add to their arsenal a 50,000-volt weapon called a Taser, a 
handgun the size of a flashlight that temporarily immobilizes suspects by firing 
electrically-charged darts. 
<c> 1982 The Washington Post, September 30, 1982 
Yesterday the weapon was demonstrated for reporters and police officials from 
the city and surrounding jurisdictions. The darts were fired into Kichael 
Dinenna, a 250-pound Bethesda bar manager to whom police had paid $250 for the 
experiment. 
When the darts had penetrated his clothing and the outer surface of his skin, 
Dinenna~ 6-foot-7, instantly fell to the floor of the lineup room at police 
headquarters, a paralyzed lump. ---
He was able to rise in about 10 seconds, but police could have kept him 
stunned and on the ground by inc reasing*ttle current through wires attached to 
the darts, police said. 
Deputy Police Chief Karty K. Tapscott said four of the weapons, costing $200 
each, will be deployed by special operations for a six-month trial period. If 
proved effective, he said, Tasers may eventually be placed in police patrol 
cars throughout the city. 
Tapscott emphasized that the new weapons are not intended to replace service 
revolvers, but as a device to subdue unruly suspects, while avoiding physical 
harm to either civilians or police officers. 
<c> 1982 The Washington Post, September 30, 1982 
"I see the use being very selective," Tapscott said. "If no situation came up 
in six months where we had to use it, then we don't need it." 
The Taser is being used by dozens of police departments across the country, 
with apparent enthusiasm . 
. , 
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and found it useful in some situations. 
Fairfax County police spokesman Capt. Andrew Page said four Tasers have 
been in use on a test basis since April, and the department is considering 
ordering seven more, one for each of the county's police substations. 
Page said the Tasers have been called into action three times, twice on the 
same individual. That man, Page said, was a noncooperative "weight-lifter type" 
whose parents had signed mental commitment papers to have him taken away. 
Page said the man was zapped once to get him to the hospital, and then, after 
being treated and released, he again was ordered commited and he again resisted 
-- until police approached with the Taser. 
(c) 1982 The Washington Post, September 30, 1982 
"He didn't want to get shot again," Page said. 
"If you've ever worked on a car and touched a spark plug while the motor was 
runningi then you know what it feels like," said Prince George's County Police 
Sgt. Bi 1 Spalding. "It's the same pulsing sensation, only 20 times worse." 
Spalding got the Taser's darts in his thigh last year during a 
demonstration in which he pretended to hold a cocked revolver to the head of a 
hostage. Both he and the revolver fell to the floor before he could pull the 
trigger. 
Prince George's police have used Tasers to subdue two drug-influenced 
suspects at the Capitol Centre. On another occasion, while trying to serve 
commitment papers, Spalding used a Taser on a man who had barricaded himself 
inside his house with a wooden club. 
"It knocked him right out of his house slippers," Spalding said. 
Police in Los Anoeles have had the use of 80 Tasers for the last year and a 
half. Department sp6kesman Pat Connelly said another 300 are being ordered for 
patrol cars. 
(C) 1982 The Washington Post, 
"I think it's a wonderful weapon," said Gary Hankins, head of the bargaining 
committee for the Fraternal Order of Police, the labor organization for 
rank-and-file officers. 
deadly 
GRAPHIC: Picture, Steve Lyddane hold Taser weapon in his hand as he explains 
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Copyright <c> 1976 Congressional Quarterly; ~ 
Editorial Research Reports--The Reminder Service ~\~ 
April 23, 1976, Friday 
LENGTH: 390 words 
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~~ .,_...) 
HEADLINE: The Taser Zap 
BYLINE: Suzanne de Lesseps 
BODY: 
It was a scene right out of James Bond. Last November two jewel thieves 
accosted a diamond merchant in N.ew York City, zapped him with an electric Taser 
dart gun and stole away with $100,000 worth of loot. The merchant suffered only 
temporary after-affects from the stinging attack. In ~iami last fall, a young 
woman fired a Taser gun at a gas station attendant and made off with the 
station•s cash. "I fell on the floor and couldn•t move," William Lawson said 
after the incident. "It was like sticking your finger in a wall socket ..• the 
worst pain I ever felt." 
Ccl 1976 Congressional Quarterly , April 23, 1976 
What is this new, high-voltage weapon that sells for $199.50? Also known as 
a " stun gun, " the Taser was invented by a California man named John J. Cover, 
who always wanted to build an electronic rifle patterned after those owned by 
Buck Rogers and Flash Gordon. What he finally came up with, is a hand-held 
device weighing only one-and-one-half pounds which transmits an electric current 
through two darts, each attached to 15 feet of wire. The darts are fired into 
the skin or clothing of the victim. 
"When the Taser•s electrical force is powered into the body, it generates an 
electric current that dominates [theJ neuromuscular system," says promotional 
advertising for the weapon. "When an attacker has been •Tasered,• the muscles 
in his body involuntarily contract; he is virtually helpless and may experience 
pain." The most attractive feature of the Taser, according to its marketers, is 
that it is not lethal and its effects are over in minutes. Some doctors, 
however, have charged that the Taser can cause grave injury, particularly if 
used against young children, the elderly or those with heart problems. 
The Taser has primarily been marketed as a self-defense weapon--a device for 
housewives, students, shopkeepers and security guards to use in case of attack. 
But as the examples above show, the Taser has appealed to perpetrators of crime 
as well. In New York City, the electrical device has been declared illegal, and 
according to a ruling by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms all 
<cl 1976 Congressional Quarterly , April 23, 1976 
Tasers bought and sold after Friday, April 30! must be registered as firearms. 
In the world of mystery novels and science fiction, electric zap guns are 
romantic and intriguing. In reality, however, they may not be quite as 
appealing. 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
RE: 
.SJqJrtmt <lfonrl uf tift ~b .Statts 
..-u-Jri:ngbtn. ~. <If. 21lp'!~ 
November 9, 1984 
No. 83-1035) - Tennessee v. Garner 
/ 
83-1070)- Memphis Police Dept. v. Garner 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Although I find it difficult to say the action 
of the officer was unreasonable, I am prepared to affirm 
on the narrow basis Byron and some others discussed. 
I have assigned it to Byron. 
Regards, 
; 
To: The Chief Justice ~r_(J 
Justice Brennan 
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CLEAMTEE GARNER, ETC., ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS 
83-1070 v. 
CLEAMTEE GARNER, ETC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[December - , 1984] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case requires us to determine the constitutionality of 
the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of an apparently 
unarmed suspect~elon. We conclude that such forc~y J ~ ~  
not be used unle~ecessary to prevent the escape an'am e 
of~sonabll believes that t e suspect poses a signifi- ~ 
c ath or serious physical injury to the officer or p q> 
others. 
I 
At about 10:45 p. m. on October 3, 1974, Memphis Police 
Officers Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright were dispatched to 
answer a "prowler inside call." Upon arriving at the scene 
they saw a woman standing on her porch and gesturing to-
83-1035-0PINION 
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ward the adjacent house. 1 She told them she had heard 
glass breaking and that "they" or "someone" was breaking in 
next door. While Wright radioed the dispatcher to say that 
they were on the scene, Hymon went behind the house. He 
heard a door slam and saw someone run across the back yard. 
The fleeing suspect, who was petitioner's decedent, Ed-
ward Garner, stopped at a six-feet-high chain link fence at 
the edge of the yard. With the aid of a flashlight, Hymon 
was able to see Garner's face and hands. He saw no sign of a 
weapon, and, though not certain, was "reasonably sure" and 
"figured" that Garner was unarmed. App. 41, 56; Record 
219. He thought Garner was 17 or 18 years old and about 
5' 5" or 5' 7" tall. 2 While Garner was crouched at the base 
of the fence, Hymon called out "police, halt" and took a few 
steps toward him. Garner then began to climb over the 
fence. Convinced that if Garner made it over the fence he 
would elude capture, 3 Hymon shot him. The bullet hit Gar-
ner in the back of the head. Garner was taken by ambulance 
'The owner of the house testified that no lights were on in the house, 
but that a back door light was on. Record 160. Officer Hymon, though 
uncertain, stated in his deposition that there were lights on in the house. 
Record 209. 
2 In fact, Garner, an eighth-grader, was 15. He was 5' 4" tall and 
weighed somewhere around 100 or 110 pounds. App. to Pet. for Cert. A5. 
3 When asked at trial why he fired, Hymon stated: 
"Well, first of all it was apparent to me from the little bit that I knew about 
the area at the time that he was going to get away because, number one, I 
couldn't get to him. My partner then couldn't find where he was because, 
you know, he was late coming around. He didn't know where I was talk-
ing about. I couldn't get to him because of the fence here, I couldn't have 
jumped this fence and come up, consequently jumped this fence and caught 
him before he got away because he was already up on the fence, just one 
leap and he was already over the fence, and so there is no way that I could 
have caught him." App. 52. 
He also stated that the area beyond the fence was dark, that he could not 
have gotten over the fence easily because he was carrying a lot of equip-
ment and wearing heavy boots, and that Garner, being younger and more 
energetic, could have outrun him. !d., at 53-54. 
; 
83-1035-0PINION 
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to a hospital, where he died on the operating table. Ten dol-
lars and a purse taken from the house were found on his 
body. 4 
In using deadly force to prevent the escape, Hymon was 
acting under the authority of a Tennesse statute and pursu-
ant to police department policy. The statute provides that 
"[i]f, after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he 
either flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the neces-
sary means to effect the arrest." Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 40-7-108. 5 The department policy was slightly more re-
strictive than the statute, but still allowed the use of deadly 
force in cases of burglary. App. 140-144. The incident was 
reviewed by the Memphis Police Firearm's Review Board 
and presented to a grand jury. Neither took any action. 
App. 57. 
Garner's father then brought this action in the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Tennessee, seeking 
damages under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for asserted violations of 
Garner's constitutional rights. The complaint alleged that 
the shooting violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
It named as defendants Officer Hymon, the police depart-
ment, its Director, and the Mayor and city of Memphis. 
Mter a 3-day bench trial, the District Court entered judg-
ment for all defendants. It dismissed the claims against the 
Mayor and the Director for lack of evidence. It then con-
cluded that Hymon's actions were authorized by the Tennes-
see statute, which in turn was constitutional. Hymon had 
• Garner had rummaged through one room in the house, in which, in the 
words of the owner, "all the stuff was out on the floor, all the drawers was 
pulled out, and stuff was scattered all over." App. 34. The owner testi-
fied that his valuables were untouched but that, in addition to the purse 
and the 10 dollars, one of his wife's rings was missing. The ring was not 
recovered. App. 34-35. 
' Although the statute does not say so explicitly, Tennessee law forbids 
the use of deadly force in the arrest of a misdemeanant. See Johnson v. 
State, 173 Tenn. 134, 114 S. W. 2d 819 (1938). 
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employed the only reasonable and practicable means of pre-
venting Garner's escape. Garner had "recklessly and heed-
lessly attempted to vault over the fence to escape, thereby 
assuming the risk of being fired upon." App. to Pet. for 
Cert. A10. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed with 
regard to Hyman, finding that he had acted in good faith reli-
ance on the Tennessee statute and was therefore within the 
scope of his qualified immunity. 600 F. 2d 52 (1979). It re-
manded for reconsideration of the possible liability of the 
city, however, in light of Monell v. Department of Social 
Services, 436 U. S. 658 (1978), which had come down after 
the District Court's decision. The District Court was di-
rected to consider whether a city enjoyed a qualified immu-
nity, whether the use of deadly force and hollow point bullets 
in these circumstances was constitutional, and whether any 
unconstitutional municipal conduct flowed from a "policy or 
custom" as required for liability under Monell. 600 F. 2d, at 
54-55. 
The District Court concluded that Monell did not affect its 
decision. While acknowledging some doubt as to the possi-
ble immunity of the city, it found that the sta~and 
Hyman's actions, were constitutional. Given this conclu-
sion, 1 ec me o consider the "policy or custom" question. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. A37-A39. 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 710 F. 2d 
240 (CA6 1983). It reasoned that the killing of a fleeing sus-
pect is a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, 6 and is 
therefore co"nstitutional only if "reasonable." The Tennessee 
statute failed as applied to this case because it did not ade-
quately limit the use of deadly force by distinguishing be-
tween felonies of different magnitudes-"The facts, as found, 
did not justify the use of deadly force under the Fourth 
• "The right of the people to be secure in their persons 0 0 0 against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . ... " U. S. 
Canst. , Arndt. 4. 
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Amendment." I d., at 246. Officers cannot resort to deadly 
force unless they "have probable cause to believe that the 
suspect [has committed a felony <md] p~to the 
safety of the officers or a danger to the communit.YJ.f left at 
lar~~. 
he State of Tennessee, which had intervened to defend 
the statute, see 28 U. S. C. § 2403(c), appealed to this Court. 
No. 83-1035. The city filed a petition for certiorari. No. 
83-1070. We noted probable jurisdiction in the appeal and 
granted the petition. -- U. S. -- (1984). 
II 
Whenever an officer restrains the free~<pn of a person 
to walk away, he has seized that person. '1Jnited States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975). While it is not 
always clear just when minimal,ifolice interference becomes a 
seizure, see ' United States ¥.'-Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544 
(1980), there can be no question that apprehension by the use 
7 The Court of Appeals concluded that the rule set out in the Model 
Penal Code "accurately states Fourth Amendment limitations on the use of 
deadly force against fleeing felons." 710 F. 2d, at 247. The relevant por-
tion of the Model Penal Code provides: 
"The use of deadly force is not justifiable ... unless (i) the arrest is for a 
felony, and (ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a 
peace officer or is assisting a person whom he believes to be authorized to 
act as a peace officer; and (iii) the actor believes that the force employed 
creates no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and (iv) the actor 
believes that (1) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct 
including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or (2) there is a sub-
stantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious 
bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed." American Law Institute, 
Model Penal Code § 3.07(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). 
The court also found that the Due Process Clause required the same re-
sult, because the statute was not narrowly drawn to further a compelling 
state interest. The court considered the generalized interest in effective 
law enforcement sufficiently compelling only when the the suspect is dan-
gerous. Finally, the court held, relying on Owen v. City of Independence, 
445 U. S. 622 (1980), that the city was not immune. 
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of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment. -------
A 
A police officer may arrest a person if he has probable 
cause to believe that person committed a crime. E. g., 
United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411 (1976). Petitioners 
argue that if this requirement is satisfied the Fourth Amend-
ment has nothing to say about how that seizure is made. 
This submission ignores the many cases in which this Court, 
by balancin the extent of the intrusion a ainst th need for 
it, has examine t e reasona eness of the manner in which a 
search or seizure is conducted. To determine the constitu-
tionality of a seizure "[ w ]e must balance the nature and qual-
ity of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment in-
terests against the importance of the governmental inte~sts 
alleged to justify the intrusion." United Statey-v. 'rPlace, 
-- U. S. -- , -- (1983); see Dela7!JI-Lre v. -Prouse, 440 
U. S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. 'Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U. S. 543, 555 (1976). We have described "the balancing of 
competing intere§,ts" as "the key principle of the Fourth 
Amendment." vMichirJ.I1n v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 700, n. 
12 (1981). See also>Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 
523, 536-537 (1967). Because one of the factors is the extent 
of the intrusion, it is plain that reasonableness depends on 
not only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried 
out. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 895 (1975); Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 28-29 (1968). 
Applying these principles to particular facts, the Court has 
held that governmental interests did not support a lengthy 
detention of luggage, United States v. Place, supra, an air-
port seizure not "carefully tailored to its underlying justifica-
tion," Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 505-505 (1983) (plu-
rality opinion), surgery under general anasthesia to obtain 
evidence, Winston v. Lee, -- U. S. -- (1985), or deten-
tion for fingerprinting without probable cause, Davis v. Mis-
" 
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sissippi, 394 U. S. 721 (1969). On the other hand, under the 
same approach it has UP.held the takin of fin ernail scrap-
iJlgs from a suspect,c.-Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291 (1973), 
an unannounced entry into a home to prevent the destruction 
of evidence, Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23 (1963), adminis-
trative housing inspections without a warrant and without 
probable cause to believe that a code violation will be found, 
Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, and a blood test of a 
drunk-driving suspect, Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 
757 (1966). In each of these cases, the question was whether 
the totality of the circumstances justified a particular sort of 
search or seizure. 
B 
The SJt_me balancing proc~ss applied in the cases cited 
above demonstrates that, notwithstanding probable cause to 
seize a suspect, an officer may not always do so by killing 
him. The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force 
is unmatched. The suspect's fundamental interest in his own 
life need not be elaborated upon. The use of deadly force 
also frustrates the interest of the individual, and of society, in 
judicial determination of guilt and punishment. Against this 
interest petitioners and appellant range governmental inter-
ests in effective law enforcement. They argue that overall 
violence will be reduced by encouraging the peaceful submis-
sion of suspects who know that they may be shot if they flee. 
Effectiveness in making arrests requires the resort to deadly 
force, or at least the meaningful threat thereof. "Being able 
to arrest such individuals is a condition precedent to the 
state's entire system of law enforcement." Brief for Peti-
tioners 14. 
Without in any way disparaging the importance of these 
goals, we are not convinced that the use of deadly force is a 
sufficiently productive means of accomplishing them to jus-
tify the killin of nonviolent suspects. Cf. Delaware v. 
Prouse, supra, at 659. e use of deadly force is a self-
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defeating way of apprehending a suspect and so setting the 
criminal justice mechanism in motion. If successful, it guar- ~ 
antees that that mechanism will not be set in motion. And !J 
while the meaningful threat of deadly force might be thought 
to lead to the arrest of more live suspects by discouraging es-
cape attempts, 8 the presently available evidence does not 
support this thesis. 9 The fact is that a majority of police de-
partments in this country have forbidden the use of deadly 
force against nonviolent suspects. See Section IIIC, infra. 
If those charged with the enforcement of the criminal law 
have abjured the use of deadly force in arresting nondanger-
ous felons, there is a substantial basis for doubting that the 
8 We note that the usual manner of deterring illegal conduct-through 
punishment-has been largely ignored in connection with flight from ar-
rest. Arkansas, for example, specifically excepts flight from arrest from 
the offense of"obstruction of governmental operations." The commentary 
notes that this "reflects the basic policy judgment that, absent the use of { 
force or violence, a mere attempt to avoid apprehension by a law enforce-
ment officer does not give rise to an independent offense." Ark. Stat. 
Ann. § 41-2802(3)(a) and commentary. In the few States that do outlaw 
flight from an arresting officer, the crime is only a misdemeanor. See, 
e. g., Ind. Code§ 35-44-3-3. Even forceful resistance, though generally a 
separate offense, is classified as a misdemeanor. E. g., Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 
38, § 31-1; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-7-301; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:2; 
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 162.315. 
This le~ach does avoid the anomoly of automatically trans-
forming every fleeing misdemeanant into a fleeing felon-subject, under 
the common law rule, to apprehension by deadly force-solely by virtue of 
his flight. However, it is in real tension with the harsh consequences of 
flight in cases where deadly force is employed. For example, Tennessee 
does not outlaw fleeing from arrest. The Memphis City Code does, 
§ 30-15, subjecting the offender to a maximum fine of $50, § 1-8. Thus, 
Garner's attempted escape subjected him to (a) a $50 fine, and (b) being 
shot. 
9 See M. Punch, Control in the Police Organization 98 (1983); Fyfe, Ob-
servations on Police Deadly Force, 27 Crime & Delinqu. 376, 378-381 
(1981); W. Geller & K. Karales, Split-Second Decisions 67 (1981); App. 84 
(Affidavit of William Bracey, Chief of Patrol, New York City Police De-
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use of such force is an essential attribute of the arrest power 
in all felony cases. See Schumann v. McGinn, 240 N. W. 2d 
525, 540 (Minn. 1976) (Rogosheske, J., dissenting in part). 
Petitioners and appellant have not persuaded us that shoot-
ing nondangerous fleeing suspects is so vital as to outweigh 
the suspect's interest in his own life. 
The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony 
sus_R,ects, w atever e c1rcums ances, is constitutionally un-
reasonable. -. It IS not Detter that all felony SUSpects die than 
eSC"ape: Where the suspect poses no immediate threat, the 
harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify 
the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate 
when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but the fact that the 
police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not 
always justify killing the suspect. A police officer may not 
seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him 
dead. The Tennessee statute is unconstitutional insofar as it 
authorizes the use of deadly force against such fleeing 
suspects. 
It is not, however, unconstitutional on its face. Where the 
o~r~onably: bel~ves that the suspectpoSes a threat of 
serious__,Q! !ZSical harm, ~e officer or to otfiers, it is 
not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using 
deadly force. If a fleeing suspect is armed with a lethal 
weapon or if there is ;erobable cause to b~ieve th.i;!t h.e..-has J 
committed a crime involvin the inflicti'on or threatened in- lie 0 ~ 
fliction o se 1ous ph sical harm, deadly force may e used if }'f 
necessary o prevent escape and if, where feasible, some L.-t_ ~
warning has been given. As applied in such circumstances, ~ k 
the Tennessee statute passes constitutional muster. 
III ~ ,tH4.;tl;~:~---..g...,,. 
A 
It is insisted that the Fourth Amendment must be con-
strued in light of the common law rule allowing the use of 
whatever force that was necessary to effect the arrest of a 
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fleeing felon, though not a misdemeanant. As stated by 
Hale in 1788: 
"If persons that are pursued by these officers for felony 
or the just suspicion thereof . . . shall not yield them-
selves to these officers, but shall either resist or fly be-
fore they are apprehended or being apprehended shall 
rescue themselves and resist or fly, so that they cannot 
otherwise be apprehended, and are upon necessity slain 
therein, because they cannot be otherwise taken, it is no 
felony." 2 Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 
85-86 (1788). See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 
on the Laws of England *289. 
Most American jurisdictions also imposed a flat prohibition 
against the use of deadly force td stop a fleeing misde-
meanant, coupled with a general privilege to use such force to 
stop a fleeing felon. E. g., Holloway v. Moser, 193 N. C. 
185, 136 S. E. 375 (1927); State v. Smith, 103 N. W. 944, 
945 (Iowa 1905); Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn. 720 (1879); Brooks 
v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352 (1869); Roberts v. State, 14 
Mo. 138 (1851); see generally R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Crimi-
nal Law 1098-1102 (3d ed. 1982); Day, Shooting the Fleeing 
Felon: State of the Law, 14 Grim. L. Bull. 285, 286-287 
(1978); Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 
798, 807-816 (1924). But see Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329 
(1882); State v. Bryant, 65 N. C. 327, 328 (1871); Caldwell v. 
State, 41 Tex. 86 (1874). 
The State and city argue that because this was the prevail-
ing rule at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment 
and for some time thereafter, and is still a frequent rule, use 
of deadly force against a fleeing felon must be "reasonable." 
It is true that this Court has often looked to the common law 
in evaluating the reasonableness, for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, of police activity. See, e. g., United States v. 
Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 418-419 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 
U. S. 103, 111, 114 (1975); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U. S. 132, 149-153 (1925). On the other hand, it "has not 
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simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement 
practices that existed at the time of the Fourth Amendment's 
passage." Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 591, n. 33 
(1980). Because of sweeping change in the legal and techno-
logical context, reliance on the common law rule in this case 
would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a 
historical inquiry. 
B 
It has been pointed out many times that the common law 
rule is best understood in light of the fact that it arose at a 
time when virtually all felonies were punishable by death. 10 
"Though effected without the protections and formalities of 
an orderly trial and conviction, the killing of a resisting or 
fleeing felon resulted in no greater consequences than those 
authorized for punishment of the felony of which the individ-
ual was charged or suspected." Model Penal Code § 3.07, 
Comment 3, at 56 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958) (hereinafter 
Model Penal Code Comm.ent). Courts have also justified the 
common law rule by emphasizing the relative dangerousness 
of felons. See, e. g., Schumann v. McGinn, 240 N. W. 2d 
525, 533 (Minn. 1976); Holloway v. Moser, 193 N. C. 185, 
187, 136 S. E. 375, 376 (1927). 
Neither of these justifications makes sense today. Almost 
all crimes formerly punishable by death no longer are or can 
be. See, e. g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 762 (1978); 
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977). And while in earlier 
10 The roots of the concept of a "felony" lie not in capital punishment but 
in forfeiture. 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 465 
(2d ed. 1909) (hereinafter Pollock & Maitland). Not all felonies were al-
ways punishable by death. See id., at 466-467, n. 3. Nonetheless, the 
link was profound. Blackstone was able to write that "[t]he idea of felon is 
indeed so generally connected with that of capital punishment, that we find 
it hard to separate them; and to this usage the interpretations of the law do 
now conform. And therefore if a statute makes any new offence felony the 
law implies that is shall be punished with death, viz. by hanging, as well as 
with forfeiture .... " 4 W. Blackstone *98. See also R. Perkins & R. 
Boyce, Criminal Law 14-15 (3d ed. 1982); 2 Pollock and Maitland 511. 
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times "the gulf between the felonies and the minor offences 
was broad and deep," 2 Pollock & Maitland 467 n. 3; Carroll 
v. United States, 367 U. S. 132, 158 (1925), today the distinc-
tion is minor and often arbitrary. Many crimes considered 
to be misdemeanors, or nonexistent, at common law are now 
felonies. Wilgus 572-573. These changes have undermined 
the concept, which was questionable to begin with, that use 
of deadly force against a fleeing felon is merely a speedier 
execution of someone who has already forfeited his life. 
They have also made the assumption that a "felon" is more 
dangerous than a misdemeanant untenable. Indeed, numer-
ous misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than 
many felonies. 11 
There i~ an additional reason that the common law rule 
cannot be directly translated to the present day. The com-
mon law rule developed at a time when weapons were rudi-
mentary. Deadly force could be inflicted almost solely in a 
hand-to-hand struggle during which, necessarily, the safety 
of the arresting officer was at risk. Handguns were not car-
ried by police officers until the latter half of the last century. 
L. Kennett & J. Anderson, The Gun in America 91 (1975). 
Only then did it become possible to use deadly force from a 
distance as a means of apprehension. As a practical matter, 
the use of deadly force under the standard articulation of the 
common law rule has an altogether different meaning-and 
harsher consequences-now than in past centuries. See 
Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale for the Law of Homicide: I, 
37 Colum. L. Rev. 701, 741 (1937). 12 
11 White collar crime, for example, poses a less significant physical threat 
than, say, drunken driving. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, -U.S. -
(1984); id., at- (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). See Model Penal Code, 
comment 57. 
12 It has been argued that sophisticated techniques of apprehension and 
increased communication between the police in different jurisdictions have 
made it more likely that an escapee will be caught than was once the case, 
and that this change has reduced the "reasonableness" of the use of deadly 
force to prevent escape. E. g., Sherman, Execution Without Trial: Police 
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One other aspect of the common law rule bears emphasis. 
It forbids the use of deadly force to apprehend a misde-
meanant, condemning such action as disproportionately se-
vere. See Holloway v. Moser, 193 N. C. 185, 187, 136 S. E. 
2d 375, 376 (1927); State v. Smith, 103 N. W. 944, 945 (Iowa 
1905). 
In short, though the common law pedigree of Tennessee's 
rule is pure on its face, changes in the legal and technological 
context mean the rule is distorted almost beyond recognition 
when literally applied. 
B 
In evaluating the reasonableness of police procedures 
under the Fourth Amendment, we haye also looked to pre-
vailing rules in individual jurisdictions. See, e. g., United 
States v. Watson, supra, at 421-422. The rules in the States 
are varied. Some 19 States have codified the common law 
rule, 13 though in two of these the courts have significantly 
limited the statute. 14 · Four States, though without a rele-
Homicide and the Constitution 33 Vand. L. Rev. 71, 76 (1980). We are 
unaware of any data that would permit sensible evaluation of this claim. 
Current arrest rates are sufficiently low, however, that we have some 
doubt whether in past centuries the failure to arrest at the scene meant 
that the police had missed their only chance in a way that is not presently 
the case. In 1983, 21% of the offenses in the FBI crime index were cleared 
by arrest. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Index 159 
(1983). The clearance rate for burglary was 15%. Ibid. 
13 Ala. Code § 13A-3-27; Ark. State. Ann. § 41-510; Cal. Penal Code 
Ann. § 196 (West); Conn. Gen Stat. § 53(a)-22; Fla. Stat. § 776.05; Idaho 
Code § 19-610; Ind. Code § 35-41-3-3; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3215; Miss. 
Code Ann. § 97-3-15(d); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.046; Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§200.140; N. M. Stat. Ann. §30-2-6; Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §732; Ore. Rev. 
Stat. § 161.239; R. I. Gen. Laws§ 12-7-9; SD Code§§ 22-26-32, -33; Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 40-7-108; Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(3). Wisonsin's stat-
ute is ambiguous, but should probably be added to this list. Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.45(4) (officer may use force necessary for "a reasonable accomplish-
ment of a lawful arrest"). 
14 In California, the police may use deadly force to arrest only if the 
crime for which the arrest is sought was "a forcible and atrocious one which 
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vant statute, apparently retain the common law rule. 15 
Three States have adopted the Model Penal Code's provision 
verbatim. 16 Sixteen others allow, in slightly varying lan-
guage, the use of deadly force only if the suspect has commit-
ted a felony involving physical or deadly force, or is escaping 
with a deadly weapon, or is likely to endanger life or inflict 
serious physical injury if not arrested. 17 Louisiana and V er-
threatens death or serious bodily hann," or there is a substantial risk that 
the person whose arrest is sought will cause death or serious bodily hann if 
apprehension is delayed. Kortum v. Alkire, 69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 333, 138 
Cal. Rptr. 26, 30-31 (1977). See also People v. Ceballos, 12 Cal.3d 470, 
476-484, 526 P. 2d 241, 245-248 (1974); Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. 
Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 373-374, 132 Cal. Rptr. 348, 353-354 
(1976). In Indiana, deadly force may be used only to prevent injury, the 
imminent danger of injury or force, or the threat of force. It is not permit-
ted simply to prevent escape. Rose v. State, 431 N. E. 2d 521 (Ind. App. 
1982). 
16 These are Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia. Werner v. 
Hartfelder, 113 Mich. App. 747, 318 N. W. 2d 825 (1982); State v. Foster, 
60 Ohio Misc. 46, 396 N. E. 2d 246, 255-258 (Com. Pl. 1979) (citing cases); 
Berry v. Hamman, 203 Va. 596, 125 S. E. 2d 851 (1962); Thompson v. 
Norfolk & W. R., 182 S. E. 880, 883-884 (W. Va. 1935). 
16 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 703-307; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1412; N. J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:3-7. Seen. 7, supra. 
17 Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.81.370(a); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-410; Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 18-1-707; Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 467 (felony involving 
physical force and a substantial risk that the suspect will cause death or 
serious bodily injury or will never be recaptured); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, 
§ 7-5; Iowa Code § 804.8 (suspect has used or threatened deadly force in 
commission of a felony, or would use deadly force if not caught); Ky. Rev. 
Stat. § 503.090 (suspect committed felony involving use or threat of physi-
cal force likely to cause death or serious injury, and is likely to endanger 
life unless apprehended without delay); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, 
§ 107 (commentary notes that deadly force may be used only "where the 
person arrested poses a threat to human life"); Minn. Stat. § 609.066; N. H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:5(11) (Supp.); N. Y. Penal Law § 35.30; N. C. Gen. 
Stat. § 15A-401; N. D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-07.2.d; Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 
18, § 508 (Purdon); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.51(c); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
404. Massachusetts probably belongs in this category. Though it once 
rejected distinctions between felonies, Uraneck v. Lima, 359 Mass. 749, 
750 (1971), it has since adopted the Model Penal Code limitations with re-
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mont, though without statutes or case law on point, do forbid 
the use of deadly force to prevent any but violent felonies. 18 
The remaining States either have no relevant statute or case-
law, or have positions that are unclear. 19 
It is not accurate to say that there is a constant or over-
whelming trend away from the common law rule. In recent 
years, some States have reviewed their laws and expressly 
rejected abandonment of the common law rule. 20 N onethe-
less, the long-term movement has been away from the rule 
that deadly force may be used against any fleeing felon, and 
that remains the rule in less than half the States. 
This trend is more evident and impressive when viewed in 
light of the policies adopted by the police departments them-
selves. Overwhelmingly, these are more restrictive than 
the common law rule. C. Milton et al., Police Use of Deadly 
Force 45-46 (1977). The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and the New York City Police Department, for example1 
both forbid the use of firearms except when necessary to pre-
gard to private citizens, Commonwealth v. Klein, 372 Mass. 823, 363 N. E. 
2d 1313 (1977), and seems to have extended that decision to police officers, 
Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. 391, 403 N. E. 2d 931 (1980). 
18 See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:20(2) (West); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 53, 
§ 2305. A Federal District Court has interpreted the Louisiana statute to 
limit the use of deadly force against fleeing suspects to situations where 
"life itself is endangered or great bodily harm is threatened." Sauls v. 
Hutto, 304 F. Supp. 124, 132 (ED La. 1969). 
19 These are Georgia, Maryland, Montana, South Carolina, and Wyo-
ming. A Maryland appellate court has indicated that deadly force may not 
be used against a felon who "was in the process of fleeing and, at the time, 
presented no immediate danger to ... anyone .... " Giant Food, Inc. v. 
Scherry, 445 A. 2d 483, 486, 489 (Md. App. 1982). 
20 In adopting its current statute in 1979, for example, Alabama ex-
pressly chose the common law rule over more restrictive provisions. Ala. 
Code pp. 67-68 (1982). Missouri likewise considered but rejected a pro-
posal akin to the Model Penal Code rule. See Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F. 2d 
1007, 1022 (CA6 1976) (Gibson, C. J., dissenting), vacated as moot, 431 
U. S. 171 (1977). Idaho, whose current statute codifies the common law 
rule, adopted the Model Penal Code in 1971, but abandoned it in 1972. 
83-103~0PINION 
16 TENNESSEE v. GARNER 
vent death or grievous bodily harm. I d., at 40-41; App. 83. 
For accreditation by the Commission on Accreditation for 
Law Enforcement Agencies, a department must restrict the 
use of deadly force to situations where "the officer reasonably 
believes that the action is in defense of human life . . . or in 
defense of any person in immediate danger of serious physical 
injury." Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
Agencies, Inc., Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies 
1-2 (1983). A 1974 study reported that the police depart-
ment regulations in a majority of the large cities of the 
United States allowed the firing of a weapon only when a 
felon presented a threat of death or serious bodily harm. 
Boston Police Department, Planning & Research Division, 
The Use of Deadly Force by Boston Police Personnel (1974), 
cited in Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F. 2d 1007, 1016, n. 9 (CA8 
1976), vacated as moot, 431 U. S. 171 (1977). Overall, only 
7.5% of departmental and municipal polices explicitly permit 
the use of deadly force against any felon; 86.8% explicitly do 
not. Matulia, A Balance of Forces: A Report of the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police 161 (1982) (table). See 
also Record 1108-1368 (written policies of 44 departments). 
See generally Brief for The Police Foundation, et al., as 
Amici Curiae. In light of the rules adopted by those who 
must actually administer them, the older and fading common 
law view is a dubious indicia of the constitutionality of the 
Tennessee statute now before us. 
c 
Actual departmental policies are important for an addi-
tional reason. We would hesitate to declare a police practice 
of long standing "unreasonable" if doing so would severely 
hamper effective law enforcement. But the indications are 
to the contrary. Amici note that "[a]fter extensive research 
and consideration, [they] have concluded that laws permit-
ting police officers to use deadly force to apprehend unarmed, 
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izens or law enforcement officers, do not deter crime or alle-
viate problems cause by crime, and do not improve the crime-
fighting ability of law enforcement agencies." Brief for 
Police Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 11. The submis-
sion is that the obvious state interests in apprehension are 
not sufficiently served to warrant the use of lethal weapons 
against all fleeing felons. 
Nor do we agree with petitioners that the rule we have 
adopted requires the police to make impossible, split-second 
evaluations of unknowable facts. See Brief for Petitioners 
11; Brief for Appellant 25. We do not deny the practical dif-
ficulties of attempting to assess the suspect's dangerousness. 
However, similarly difficult judgments must be made by the 
police in equally uncertain circumstances. See, e. g., Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20, 27 (1968). Moreover, the highly 
technical felony/misdemeanor distinction is equally, if not 
more, difficult to apply in the field. An officer is in no posi-
tion to know, for example, the precise value of property sto-
len, or to know whether the crime was a first or second of-
fense. Finally, as noted above, this claim must be viewed 
with suspicion in light of the similar self-imposed limitations 
of so many police departments. 
IV 
The District Court concluded that Hymon was justified in 
shooting Garner because state law allows, and the Federal 
Constitution does not forbid, the use of deadly force to pre-
vent the escape of a fleeing felony suspect if no alternative 
means of apprehension is available. See App. to Pet. for 
Cert. A9-All, A38. This conlusion made a determination of 
Garner's apparent dangerousness unnecessary. The court 
did find, however, that Garner appeared to be unarmed, 
though Hymon could not be certain that was the case. I d., 
at A4, A23. Restated in Fourth Amendment terms, this 
means Hymon had no articulable basis to think Garner was 
armed. 
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In reversing, the Court of Appeals accepted the District 
Court's factual conclusions and held that "the facts, as found, 
did not justify the use of deadly force." 710 F. 2d, at 246. 
We agree. While we recognize the seriousness of the crime 
of burglary/1 Officer Hymon could not reasonably have ~e­
lieved that Garner-young, slight, and unarmed-posed any 
tlireat. Indeed, Hyman never attempted to justify his ac-
tions on any basis other than the need to prevent an escape. 
The District Court stated in passing that "[t]he facts of this 
case did not indicate to Officer Hymon that Garner was 'non-
dangerous.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. A34. This conclusion is 
not explained, and seems to be based solely on the fact that 
Garner had broken into a house at night. However, the fact 
that Garner was a suspected burglar could not, without re-
gard to the other circumstances, automatically justify the use 
o ea y orce. ymon 1 not have a reasonable belief th"at 
Garner, whom he correctly believed to be unarmed, posed 
any physical danger to himself or others. 
v 
We wish to make clear what our holding means in the con-
text of this case. The complaint has been dismissed as to all 
21 The Federal Bureau of Investigation classifies burglary as a "prop-
erty'' rather than a "violent" crime. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Uniform Crime Reports 1 (1983). However, burglary has also been 
viewed as an inherently life-threatening crime. See, e. g., Common-
wealth v. Klein, 363 N. E. 2d 1313, 1319 and n. 9 (Mass. 1977); W. Prosser, 
Law of Torts 134 (4th ed. 1964). Some state statutes that limit the use of 
deadly force to certain violent felonies include burglary in the list. See Ill. 
Rev. Stat. Ann., ch. 38, § 7-5. As this case demonstrates, however, the 
fact that someone has broken into a dwelling at night does not automati-
cally mean he is physically dangerous. See also Solem v. Helm, -
U. S. -,---and nn. 22-23 (1983). In fact, the available statis-
tics indicate that burglaries only rarely involve physical violence. See 
T. Reppetto, Residential Crime 17, 105 (1974); Conklin & Bittner, Bur-
glary in a Suburb, 11 Criminology 208, 214 (1974). The instances where 
violence has taken place and an officer pursuing the suspect is unaware of it 
will be even fewer. 
t 
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the individual defendants. The State is a party only by vir-
tue of 28 U. S. C. § 2403(c) and is not subject to liability. 
The possible liability of the remaining defendants-the police 
department and the city of Memphis-hinges on Monell v. 
Department of Social Services, supra, and is left for remand. 
We hold that the statute is invalid insofar as it purported to 
give Hymon the authority to act as he did. As for the policy 
of the police department, the absence of any discussion of this 
issue by the courts below, and the uncertain state of the 
record, preclude any consideration of its validity. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed and the 
case remanded for further procedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
So ordered. 
December 18, 1984 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 83-1035 AND 83-1070 
TENNESSEE, APPELLANT 
83-1035 v. 
CLEAMTEE GARNER, ETC., ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
MEMPHIS POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS 
83-1070 v. 
CLEAMTEE GARNER, ETC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
[February - , 1985] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. 
The Court today holds that the Fourth Amendment prohib-
its a police officer from using deadly force as a last resort to 
apprehend a criminal suspect who refuses to halt when flee-
ing the scene of a nighttime burglary. This conclusion rests 
on the majority's balancing of the interests of the suspect and 
the public interest in effective law enforcement. Ante, at 6. 
Notwithstanding the venerable common law rule authorizing 
the use of deadly force if necessary to apprehend a fleeing 
felon, and continued acceptance of this rule by nearly half the 
States, ante, at 13-15, the majority concludes that Tennes-
see's statute is unconstitutional inasmuch as it allows the use 
of such force to apprehend a burglary suspect who is not obvi-
ously armed or otherwise dangerous. Although the circum-
stances of this case are unquestionably tragic and unfortu-
nate, our constitutional holdings must be sensitive to both 
.1-
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the history of the Fourth Amendment and to the general im-
plications of the Court's reasoning. By disregarding the 
serious and dangerous nature of residential burglaries and 
the longstanding practice of many States, the Court effec-
tively creates a Fourth Amendment right allowing a burglary 
suspect to flee unimpeded from a police officer who has prob-
able cause to arrest, who has ordered the suspect to halt, and 
who has no means short of firing his weapon to prevent es-
cape. I do not believe that the Fourth Amendment supports 
such a right, and I accordingly dissent. 
I 
The facts below warrant brief review because they high-
light the difficult, split-second decisions police officers must 
make in these circumstances. Memphis Police Officers 
Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright responded to a late-night 
call that a burglary was in progress at a private residence. 
When the officers arrived at the scene, the caller said that 
''they'' were breaking into the house next door. App. 207. 
The officers found the residence had been forcibly entered 
through a window and saw lights on inside the house. Offi-
cer Hymon testified that when he saw the broken window he 
realized "that something was wrong inside," id., at 656, but 
that he could not determine whether anyone- either a bur-
glar or a member of the household- was within the resi-
dence. I d., at 209. As Officer Hymon walked behind the 
house, he heard a door slam. He saw Edward Eugene Gar-
ner run away from the house through the dark and cluttered 
backyard. Garner crouched next to a six-foot-high fence. 
Officer Hymon thought Garner was an adult and was unsure 
whether Garner was armed because Hymon "had no idea 
what was in the hand [that he could not see] or what he might 
have had on his person." I d., at 658-659. In fact, Garner 
was 15-years old and unarmed. Hymon also did not know 
whether accomplices remained inside the house. !d., at 657. 
The officer identified himself as a police officer and ordered 
,. 
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Garner to halt. Garner paused briefly and then sprang to 
the top of the fence. Believing that Garner would escape if 
he climbed over the fence, Hymon fired his revolver and mor-
tally wounded the suspected burglar. 
Respondent, the deceased's father, filed a § 1983 action in 
federal court against Hymon, the city of Memphis, and other 
defendants, for asserted violations of Garner's constitutional 
rights. The District Court for the Western District of Ten-
nessee held that Officer Hymon's actions were justified by a 
Tennessee statute that authorizes a police officer to "use all 
the necessary means to effect the arrest," if "after notice of 
the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forc-
ibly resist." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-808. As construed by 
the Tennessee courts, this statute allows the use of deadly 
force only if a police officer has probable cause to believe that 
a person has committed a felony, the officer warns the person 
that he intends to arrest him, and the officer reasonably be-
lieves that no means less than such force will prevent the 
escape. See, e. g., Johnson v. State, 173 Tenn. 134, 114 
S. W. 2d 819 (1938). The District Court held that the Ten-
nessee statute is constitutional and that Hymon's actions as 
authorized by that statute did not violate Garner's constitu-
tional rights. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
versed on the grounds that the Tennessee statute "authoriz-
ing the killing of an unarmed, nonviolent fleeing felon by 
police in order to prevent escape" violates the Fourth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 710 F . 2d 240, 244 (1983). 
The Court affirms on the ground that application of the 
Tennessee statute to authorize Officer Hymon's use of deadly 
force constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. The precise issue before the Court de-
serves emphasis, because both the decision below and the 
majority obscure what must be decided in this case. The 
issue is not the constitutional validity of the Tennessee stat-
ute on its face or as applied to some hypothetical set of facts. 
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Instead, the issue is whether the use of deadly force by Offi-
cer Hymon under the circumstances of this case violated Gar-
ner's constitutional rights. Thus, the majority's assertion 
that a police officer who has probable cause to seize a suspect 
"may not always do so by killing him," ante, at 7, is unexcep-
tionable but also of little relevance to the question presented 
here. The same is true of the rhetorically stirring statement 
that "[t]he use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all fel-
ony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally 
unreasonable." I d., at 9. The question we must address is 
whether the Constitution allows the use of such force to ap-
prehend a suspect who resists arrest by attempting to flee 
the scene of a nighttime burglary of a residence. · 
II 
For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, I agree with 
the Court that Officer Hymon "seized" Garner by shooting 
him. Whether that seizure was reasonable and therefore 
permitted by the Fourth Amendment requires a careful bal-
ancing of the important public interest in crime prevention 
and detection and the nature and quality of the intrusion 
upon legitimate interests of the individual. United States v. 
Place,-- U.S.-,-- (1983). In striking this balance 
here, it is crucial to acknowledge that police use of deadly 
force to apprehend a fleeing criminal suspect falls within the 
''rubric of police conduct necessarily [involving] swift action 
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on 
the beat." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968). The clar-
ity of hindsight cannot provide the standard for judging the 
reasonableness of police decisions made in uncertain and 
often dangerous circumstances. Moreover, I am far more 
reluctant than is the Court to conclude that the Fourth 
Amendment proscribes a police practice that was accepted at 
the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights and has contin-
ued to receive the support of many state legislatures. Al-
though the Court has recognized that the requirements of the 
,. . 
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Fourth Amendment must respond to the reality of social and 
technological change, fidelity to the notion of constitu-
tional-as opposed to purely judicial-limits on govern-
mental action requires us to impose a heavy burden on those 
who claim that practices accepted when the Fourth Amend-
ment was adopted are now constitutionally impermissible. 
See, e. g., United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, 416-421 
(1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149-153 
(1925). Cf. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, --
U. S. --,- (1983) (slip op. 6-7, 13) (noting "impressive 
historical pedigree" of statute challenged under Fourth 
Amendment). 
The public interest involved in the use of deadly force as a 
last resort to apprehend a fleeing burglary suspect relates 
primarily to the serious nature of the crime. Household bur-
glaries represent not only the illegal entry into a person's 
home, but also "pose(] real risk of serious harm to others." 
Solem v. Helm,- U. S. -,-(1983) (BURGER, C. J., 
dissenting). According to recent Department of Justice sta-
tistics, "[t]hree-fifths of all rapes in the home, three-fifths of 
all home :r:obberies, and about a third of home aggravated and 
simple assaults are committed by burglars." Bureau of Jus-
tice Statistics Bulletin, Household Burglary, p. 1 (1985). 
During the period 1973-1982, 2.8 million such violent crimes 
were committed in the course of burglaries. Ibid. Victims 
of a forcible intrusion into their home by a nighttime prowler 
will find little consolation in the majority's confident asser-
tions that "the fact that someone has broken into a dwelling 
at night does not automatically mean he is physically danger-
ous" or that "burglaries only rarely involve physical vio-
lence." Ante, at 18, n. 21. Moreover, even if a particular 
burglary, when viewed in retrospect, does not involve physi-
cal harm to · others, the "harsh potentialities for violence" 
inherent in the forced entry into a home preclude charac-
terization of the crime as "innocuous, inconsequential, minor, 
or 'nonviolent.'" Solem v. Helm, -- U. S., at -- (BUR-
.. . 
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GER, C. J., dissenting). See also Restatement of Torts§ 131 
Comment g (1934) (burglary is among felonies that normally 
cause or threaten death or serious bodily harm); R. Perkins & 
R. Boyce, Criminal Law 1110 (3d ed. 1982) (burglary is dan-
gerous felony that creates unreasonable risk of great per-
sonal harm). 
Because burglary is a serious and dangerous felony, the 
public interest in the prevention and detection of the crime is 
of compelling importance. Where a police officer has proba-
ble cause to arrest a suspected burglar, the use of deadly 
force as a last resort might well be the only means of appre-
hending the suspect. With respect to a particular burglary, 
subsequent investigation simply cannot represent a substi-
tute for immediate apprehension of the criminal suspect at 
the scene. See Report of President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of 
Crime in a Free Society 97 (1967). Indeed, the Captain of 
the Memphis Police Department testified that in his city, if 
apprehension is not immediate, it is likely that .. the suspect 
will not be caught. App. 334. Statutes such as Tennessee's 
reflect a legislative determination that the use of deadly force 
in prescribed circumstances will serve generally to protect 
the public. They assist the police in apprehending suspected 
perpetrators of serious crimes and provide notice that a law-
ful police order to stop and submit to arrest may not be 
ignored with impunity. See, e. g., Wiley v. Memphis Police 
Department, 548 F. 2d 1247, 1252-1253 (CA6), cert. denied, 
434 U. S. 822 (1977); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F. 2d 132, 142 
(CA2 1975). 
The majority unconvincingly dismisses the general deter-
rence effects by stating that ''the presently available evi-
dence does not support [the] thesis" that the threat of force 
discourages escape and that ''there is a substantial basis for 
doubting that the use of such force is an essential attribute to 
the arrest power in all felony cases." Ante, at 8-9. There is 
no question that the effectiveness of police use of deadly force 
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is arguable and that many States or individual police depart-
ments have decided not to authorize it in circumstances simi-
lar to those presented here. But it should go without saying 
that the effectiveness or popularity of a particular police 
practice does not determine its constitutionality. Cf. 
Spaziano v. Florida, -- U.S. --, -- (1984) ("The 
Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State 
reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters 
over how best to administer its criminal laws") (slip op. 16). 
Moreover, the fact that police conduct pursuant to a state 
statute is challenged on constitutional grounds does not 
impose a burden on the State to produce social science statis-
tics or to dispel any possible doubts about the necessity of the 
conduct. This observation, I believe, has particular force 
where the challenged practice both predates enactment of the 
Bill of Rights and continues to be accepted by a substantial 
number of the States. 
Against the strong public interests justifying the conduct 
at issue here must be weighed the individual interests impli-
cated in the use of deadly force by police officers. The 
majority declares that "[t]he suspect's fundamental interest 
in his own life need not be elaborated upon." Ante, at 7. 
This blithe assertion hardly provides an adequate substitute 
for the majority's failure to acknowledge the distinctive man-
ner in which the suspect's interest in his life is even exposed 
to risk. For purposes of this case, we must recall that the 
police officer, in the course of investigating a nighttime bur-
glary, had reasonable cause to arrest the suspect and ordered 
him to halt. The officer's use of force resulted because the 
suspected burglar refused to heed this command and the offi-
cer reasonably believed that there was no means short of fir-
ing his weapon to apprehend the suspect. Without question-
ing the importance of a person's interest in his life, I do not 
think this interest encompasses a right to flee unimpeded 
from the scene of a burglary. Cf. Payton v. New York, 445 
U. S. 573, 617, n. 14 (1980) (WmTE, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 
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policemen's hands should not be tied merely because of the 
possibility that the suspect will fail to cooperate with legiti-
mate actions by law enforcement personnel"). The legiti-
mate interests of the suspect in these circumstances are ade-
quately accommodated by the Tennessee statute: to avoid the 
use of deadly force and the consequent risk to his life, the 
suspect need merely obey the valid order to halt. 
A proper balancing of the interests involved suggests that 
use of deadly force as a last resort to apprehend a criminal 
suspect fleeing from the scene of a nighttime burglary is not 
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Admittedly, the events giving rise to this case are in retro-
spect deeply regrettable. No one can view the death of an 
unarmed and apparently nonviolent 15-year old without sor-
row, much less disapproval. Nonetheless, the reasonable-
ness of Officer Hymon's conduct for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be evaluated by what later appears to 
have been a preferable course of police action. The officer 
pursued a suspect in the darkened backyard of a house that 
from all indications had just been burglarized. The police 
officer was not certain whether the suspect was alone or un-
armed; nor did he know what had transpired inside the 
house. He ordered the suspect to halt, and when the sus-
pect refused to obey and attempted to flee into the night, the 
officer fired his weapon to prevent escape. The reasonable-
ness of this action for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is 
not determined by the unfortunate nature of this particular 
case; instead, the question is whether it is constitutionally 
impermissible for police officers, as a last resort, to shoot a 
burglary suspect fleeing the scene of the crime. 
Because I reject the Fourth Amendment reasoning of the 
majority and the Court of Appeals, I briefly note that no 
other constitutional provision supports the decision below. 
In addition to his Fourth Amendment claim, respondent also 
alleged violations of que process, the Sixth Amendment right 
to trial by jury, and the Eighth Amendment proscription of 
. 
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cruel and unusual punishment. These arguments were re-
jected by the District Court and, except for the due process 
claim, not addressed by the Court of Appeals. With respect 
to due process, the Court of Appeals reasoned that statutes 
affecting the fundamental interest in life must be "narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at 
stake." 710 F. 2d, at 244. The Court of Appeals concluded 
that a statute allowing police use of deadly force is narrowly 
drawn and therefore constitutional only if the use of such 
force is limited to situations in which the suspect poses an 
immediate threat to others. 710 F. 2d, at 246-247. What-
ever the validity of Tennessee's statute in other contexts, I 
cannot agree that its application iri this case resulted in a 
deprivation ''without due process of law." Cf. Baker v. 
McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 144-145 (1979). Nor do I believe 
that a criminal suspect who is shot while trying to avoid 
apprehension has a cognizable claim of a deprivation of his 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. See Cunningham 
v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-1076 (W. D. Tenn . . 
1971) (three-judge court). Finally, because there is no indi-
cation that the use of deadly force was intended to punish 
rather than to capture the suspect, there is no valid claim 
under the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U. S. 520, 538-539 (1978). Accordingly, I conclude that the 
District Court properly entered judgment against respond-
ent, and I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
III 
Even if I agreed that the Fourth Amendment was violated 
under the circumstances of this case, I would be unable to 
join the majority opinion. The reasoning of the majority is 
opaque with respect to the nature of today's holding and its 
more general implications. Relying on the Fourth Amend-
ment, the majority asserts that it is constitutionally unrea-
sonable to use deadly force against fleeing criminal suspects 
who do not appear to pose a threat of serious physical harm 
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to others. Ante, at 9. Although it is unclear from the lan-
guage of the opinion, I assume that the majority intends the 
word ''use" to include only those circumstances in which the 
suspect is actually apprehended. Absent apprehension of 
the suspect, there is no "seizure" for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. Perhaps I impute too much to the majority opin-
ion, but I doubt that the Court intends to allow criminal sus-
pects who successfully escape to return later with § 1983 
claims against officers who used, albeit unsuccessfully, 
deadly force in their futile attempt to capture the fleeing sus-
pect. Moreover, by declining to limit its holding to the use 
of firearms, the Court unnecessarily implies that the Fourth 
Amendment constrains the use of any police practice that is 
potentially lethal, no matter how remote the risk. Cf. Los 
Angeles v. Lyons,- U.S.- (1983). 
The contours of the majority's holding are not even dis-
cernible in its application to the narrow question presented 
by this case. The majority first observes that deadly force 
"may not be used unless necessary to prevent the escape and 
the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a sig-
nificant threat of death or serious physical injury to the offi-
cer or others." Ante, at 9 (emphasis added). Such a belief, 
the majority further suggests, is reasonable and therefore 
justified if the "suspect is armed with a lethal weapon or if 
there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a 
crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of seri-
ous physical harm." Ibid. (emphasis added). The majority 
indicates, however, that a police officer need not have actual 
knowledge that the suspect is armed; instead, an articulable 
basis to think the suspect is armed apparently will justify the 
use of deadly force. Even assuming that a police officer con-
fronted with a fleeing suspect who is possibly dangerous and 
refuses to heed a valid order to halt can "make subtle 
discriminations that perplex even judges in their chambers," 
Payton v. New York, 445 U. S., at 619 (WHITE, J., dissent-
ing), the majority opinion leaves unclear the very require-
,. 
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ments the Court today imposes on police conduct. Finally, 
even if it were appropriate in this case to limit the use of 
deadly force to the ambiguous class of suspects who "pose a 
significant threat of death or serious physical injury'' to oth-
ers, see Wiley v. Memphis Police Department, 548 F. 2d, at 
1253, I believe that class should include nighttime burglars 
who resist arrest by attempting to flee the scene of the crime. 
The ambiguities in the majority opinion simply invite sec-
ond-quessing of difficult police decisions that must be made 
quickly in the most trying of circumstances. Cf. Payton v. 
New York, 445 U. S., at 619 (WHITE, J., dissenting). The 
majority states that the use of deadly force is permissible if 
the suspect is armed with a lethal weapon. Ante, at 9. It is 
unclear, however, whether a police officer's use of deadly 
force can be justified by the after-the-fact discovery that the 
suspect was armed. The majority's reasoning may imply 
that the result in this case would be no different if Garner in 
fact had a weapon concealed on his person. The uncertainty 
created by the majority opinion is compounded because, as-
s'Qllling that an officer has probable cause to arrest for bur-
glary and the suspect refuses to obey an order to halt, the 
Court declines to outline the additional factors necessary to 
provide an "articulable basis" for believing that the suspect is 
armed or otherwise dangerous. Police are given no guidance 
for determining which objects, among an array of potentially 
lethal weapons ranging from guns to knives to baseball bats 
to rope, will justify the use of deadly force. We can accord-
ingly expect an escalating volume of litigation as the lower 
courts struggle to determine if a police officer's split-second 
decision to shoot was justified by the danger posed by a par-
ticular object and other facts related to the crime. Thus, the 
majority opinion portends a burgeoning area of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine concerning the circumstances in which 
police officers can reasonably employ deadly force. 
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IV 
The majority opinion sweeps broadly to adopt an ambigu-
ous standard for the constitutionality of · the use of deadly 
force to apprehend fleeing felons. Thus, the majority 
"lightly brushe[s] aside," Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. , at 
600, a longstanding police practice that predates the Fourth 
Amendment and continues to receive the approval of nearly 
half of the state legislatures. I cannot accept the majority's 
creation of a constitutional right to flight for burglary sus-
pects seeking to avoid capture at the scene of the crime. 
Whatever the constitutional limits on police use of deadly 
force in order to apprehend a fleeing felon, I do not believe 
they are exceeded in a case in which a police officer has prob-
able cause to arrest a suspect at the scene of a residential 
burglary, orders the suspect to halt, and then fires his 
weapon as a last resort to prevent the suspect's escape into 
the night. I respectfully dissent. 
02/15/85 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
/ 
RE: Nos. 83-1035 and 83-1070, Tennessee v. Garner and Memphis 
Police Dept. v. Garner, Justice O'Connor's dissent 
Justice O'Connor's statistics about burglary are 
interesting. See page 5 of the dissent. As you may remember, I 
am somewhat sympathetic to her view. Even if deadly force cannot 
be used to apprehend "non-violent" felons, one might view all 
nighttime burglars, because of the type of crime that they 
commit, as "violent felons." 
Nevertheless, I think that SO'C is unfair to Justice 
White's opinion, which you already have joined. Justice White 
did consider the validity of the statute "as applied." I also 
believe that BRW stated the holding in a clear, concise manner. 
There are, of course, some questions unresolved by the BRW 
opinion, but that is true any time the Court lays down a new rule 
of law. 
There is certainly no need for you to reconsider your 
join of BRW's opinion. 
CHAMI!IERS o,-
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.Snprtmt C!ftntri Df tlrt ~tb .Statt• 
-u!rfngton. ~- <!f. 20~'!~ 
February 15, 1985 
Re: Nos. 83-1035 
83-1070 
Tennessee v. Garner 
Memphis Police Department v. Garner 
Dear Sandra, 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMI!lERS o,-
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: 
_6u.prttttt <!fonri Df tlrt ~b _6Wts 
:.ulfington. ~. Of. 20~~~ 
March 8, 1985 
No. 83-1035 - Tennessee v. Garner 
83-1070 - Memphis Police Department v. Garner 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Few cases have given me more trouble than this one. I 
suspect it has given all of us trouble. At Conference, I was a 
"reluctant affirm," unduly, as I see it on reflection by the fact 
that the felon was only 15. But, if he turned out to be a 
~smallish~ 25 with a long record of crime, or if it turned out that 
he had left a dead woman and a wounded husband in the burgled 
house, I doubt there would be much sentiment to hold the 
Tennessee statute unconstitutional. 
This is a proverbial, classic "hard case" and I now conclude 
it produces the "bad law" attributed to that class of cases. My 
note is changed to reverse and I may write something out while 
joining Sandra's dissent. 
CHAMBERS o,-
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
i\upt"tutt <!foud of tJtt ~b ,§hdte 
1Jaelfington. ~. <!f. 21l,?)l.~ 
March 11, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1035-Tennessee v. Garner and 
No. 83-1070-Memphis Police Dept. v. Garner 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Justice White 





THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
~UF.tmt <!fonri of tltt ~b ~tatts­
Jras-ltinghtn. ~. Of. 21lp'!-~ 
March 22, 1985 
Re: (83-1035- Tennessee v. Cleamtee Garner, Etc., et al. 
( 
(83-1070- Memphis Police Department, et aL v. Cleamtee Garner, Etc., 
et al. 
Dear Byron: 
I have decided to consign my separate opinion in this case to 
the Deathless Prose file. 
I will simply join Sandra. 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
83-1035 Tennesse v. Garner (Lee) 
BRW for the Court 11/9/84 
1st draft 12/17/84 · 
2nd draft 2/15/85 
3rd draft 3/5/85 
~h draft 3/18/85 






1st draft 2/12/85 
2nd draft 2/21/85 
Joined by WHR 2/15/85 
3rd draft 3/6/85 joined by WHR 
4th draft 3/11/85 
Joined by CJ 3j22j85 
CJ may write something while joining SOC's dissent 3/8/85 
SOC will dissent 12/19/84 
